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The Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) is one of the best known measures used to tackle
anti-social behaviour. In keeping with the popular conception, the order is frequently used
against young people. Of all ASBOs issued in England and Wales up to the end of 2005,
roughly 40% were imposed on under-18s. This paper begins with a brief outline of the
three principles at the heart of the celebrated Scottish children’s hearings system. With
reference to these principles, and to the provisions which govern the use of the order
against 12–15 year olds north of the border, the paper then discusses five areas of concern
about the use of ASBOs against young people in England and Wales: the readiness to
resort to ASBOs; the forum for ASBO applications; the terms of ASBOs; publicising the
details of ASBOs; and custodial net-widening. The paper ends by suggesting reforms to
the ASBO regime in England and Wales insofar as it is used against young people.
 
INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction in April 1999, the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) has
become possibly the best known of the range of measures used to tackle anti-social
behaviour. The general awareness of the order and its entry into popular culture have
led to its acronym, ASBO, being entered in the 
 
Oxford English Dictionary
 
. It is even
possible nowadays to buy a range of ASBO merchandise! The popular understanding
is that the order is primarily aimed at out-of-control youths, who hang around in
groups intimidating and harassing local residents. This conception of the ASBO is
borne out by the statistics – up to the end of 2005, just over 40% of all ASBOs issued
in England and Wales had been against 10–17 year olds.
 
1
 
 In light of the fact that the
ASBO was actually designed for use solely against adults, this paper outlines a
number of concerns about the use of the remedy against young people in England
and Wales. Through an examination of the key principles at the heart of the celebrated
Scottish children’s hearings system, and a comparison of the ASBO regime in
England and Wales with the one in Scotland, it will suggest ways in which these
concerns could usefully be addressed.
 
* We would like to thank Andrew Halpin, Andrew Rutherford, the anonymous referees and
those who participated in a staff seminar at the School of Law, University of Southampton,
where an earlier version of this paper was presented, for their helpful comments.
 
1.
 
In England and Wales, information on the age of the recipient is available for 9544 of
the 9853 ASBOs issued to the end of 2005. Of these 9544, 3997 (41.88%) were imposed on
10–17-year-olds, and 5547 (58.12%) were imposed on those aged 18 and over (figures from
Home Office website).
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In both England and Wales and Scotland, an ASBO may be imposed on any
individual who has acted in an anti-social manner, that is to say acted in a manner
that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons
not of the same household as himself, provided that an order is considered necessary
to protect relevant persons from further anti-social acts by him.
 
2
 
 In Scotland, appli-
cations for an order may be made by local authorities and registered social landlords,
while in England and Wales chief officers of local police, the chief constable of the
British Transport Police, Housing Action Trusts and (in England) county councils
may also apply.
 
3
 
 Applications in Scotland are made to the Sheriff Court sitting in its
civil capacity,
 
4
 
 while in England and Wales they may be made to the magistrates’
court, county court and criminal court.
 
5
 
 In both jurisdictions, interim orders can also
be made.
 
6
 
 The prohibitions imposed by an ASBO must be necessary to protect people
from further anti-social acts by the defendant,
 
7
 
 and may cover any defined area within,
or the whole of, England and Wales, or Scotland.
 
8
 
 Breach of an ASBO without
reasonable excuse is a criminal offence.
 
9
 
Although ASBOs have been available against those aged 10 and over in England
and Wales since their introduction,
 
10
 
 New Labour’s original intention was that they
would not be used routinely against those aged 10–15. During the parliamentary
debates on the Crime and Disorder Bill, Home Office spokesman Alun Michael stated
that the use of ASBOs against groups of youngsters hanging around committing minor
acts of criminal damage was ‘unlikely’ to be appropriate.
 
11
 
 This was reflected in the
 
2.
 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA), s 1(1); Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act
2004 (ASB (Scotland) Act), ss 4(2) and 143(1). The term ‘relevant persons’ essentially means
those people within the area covered by the agency applying for the ASBO (CDA, s 1(1B);
ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(13)).
 
3.
 
ASB (Scotland) Act, s 18; CDA, s 1(1A).
 
4.
 
ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(1). An ASBO can also be imposed following a criminal convic-
tion in the Sheriff Court (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 234AA). As far as under-
16 s are concerned, the post-conviction ASBO should prove to be less significant in Scotland
than in England and Wales because of the relatively small numbers of children prosecuted in
the ordinary criminal court system. Children’s hearings, which deal with the vast majority of
juvenile criminal cases in Scotland, do not have the power to impose ASBOs.
 
5.
 
CDA, ss 1(3), 1B and 1C.
 
6.
 
ASB (Scotland) Act, s 7; CDA, s 1D.
 
7.
 
ASB (Scotland Act), ss 4(6) and 4(7); CDA, s 1(6). In England and Wales an ASBO may
only be discharged during its first 2 years if both the applicant for the order and the subject of
it consent; thereafter either the applicant or the subject may apply for it to be varied or
discharged (CDA, ss 1(8) and 1(9)). In Scotland the applicant for the order and the subject of
it may apply for it to be varied or revoked at any time (ASB (Scotland) Act, s 5).
 
8.
 
ASB (Scotland) Act, ss 4(6) and 4(7); CDA, s 1(6).
 
9.
 
ASB (Scotland) Act, s 9(1); CDA, s 1(10).
 
10.
 
CDA, s 1(1).
 
11.
 
Hansard
 
 HC Deb, vol 314, col 871, 23 June 1998. Opposition amendments to limit the
availability of ASBOs to those aged 16 and over were nonetheless rejected, on the basis that
this would have created a gap in the measures available to deal with so-called families from
hell. Such families – described as those in which the adult members not only commit anti-
social behaviour themselves, but also use the younger members as ‘deliverers’ of some of this
behaviour – were to be dealt with using ASBOs in the case of those aged 10 and over, and
Child Safety Orders in the case of those aged under 10 (col 869).
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draft Home Office guidance produced at the time.
 
12
 
 However, in the months between
Royal Assent and the ASBO coming into force, the government performed a U-turn,
apparently in response to strong representations made by a number of local authori-
ties.
 
13
 
 The draft guidance was revised, and the final version of the guidance published
a few weeks before the ASBO came into force stated:
‘It is unlikely that there will be many cases where it would be appropriate to
apply for an order against a 10–11 year old . . . [but] Applications may routinely be
made for the middle and older age groups of juveniles and young people (eg 12–
17 year-olds) as experience has shown that such individuals may commit serious
acts of anti-social behaviour without adult encouragement or involvement.’
 
14
 
In Scotland, by contrast, the ASBO has only recently been made available against
12–15 year olds.
 
15
 
 At the time of its introduction, the order was only available against
those aged 16 and above.
 
16
 
 When asked to explain this apparent discrepancy between
the approaches taken north and south of the border, Scottish Office Minister Henry
McLeish explained, ‘[I]n Scotland, there are already measures to deal with that age
group – we felt that, after 27 years of progress, it was vital to keep the children’s
hearings system intact’.
 
17
 
 This provoked calls for the youth justice system in England
and Wales to adopt a similar approach to the one in Scotland. Alun Michael responded:
‘I have made it clear that we believe that there are strengths in the Scottish
system and weaknesses in the system in England and Wales. That is why . . . we
have wanted to change the system in England and Wales, not by replicating the
Scottish system, but by learning from it and from what happens in other parts of
the world.’
 
18
 
This paper argues that the widespread use of the ASBO against young people in
England and Wales reflects a failure to learn from, and is symptomatic of a lack of
commitment to, the key values which are central to the Scottish children’s hearings
system. It begins with a brief description of the children’s hearings system, which
outlines the system’s three key principles. It then discusses the use of ASBOs against
young people, concentrating on five main areas of concern: the readiness to resort to
ASBOs; the forum for ASBO applications; the terms of ASBOs; publicising the
details of ASBOs; and custodial net-widening. Since the Order looks set to remain
at the forefront of the government’s campaign against anti-social behaviour, the paper
ends by outlining a suggested scheme for the reform of the ASBO regime in England
and Wales insofar as it is used against young people.
 
19
 
12.
 
Home Office 
 
Draft Guidance Document: Anti-Social Behaviour Orders
 
 (London: Home
Office, 1998) paras 3.5 and 3.10.
 
13.
 
E Burney ‘Talking tough, acting coy: what happened to the Anti-Social Behaviour
Order?’ (2002) 41 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 469 at 473–474.
 
14.
 
Home Office 
 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders – Guidance
 
 (London: Home Office, 1999)
para 2.1.
 
15.
 
ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(2)(a).
 
16.
 
CDA, s 19.
 
17.
 
Hansard
 
 HC Deb, vol 314, col 878, 23 June 1998.
 
18.
 
Hansard
 
 HC Deb, vol 314, col 880, 23 June 1998.
 
19.
 
This paper does not evaluate the existing definition of ‘anti-social behaviour’. For dis-
cussion of this definition, and suggestions for how it could usefully be reformed, see S
Macdonald ‘A suicidal woman, roaming pigs and a noisy trampolinist: refining the ASBO’s
definition of “anti-social behaviour” ’ (2006) 69 MLR 183.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE CHILDREN’S HEARINGS SYSTEM
The children’s hearings system was introduced in 1971, following the blueprint set
out in the report of the Kilbrandon Committee.
 
20
 
 Its introduction flowed in part from
dissatisfaction with the capacity of criminal court systems – including specially
modified juvenile criminal court systems – to respond appropriately to the problem-
atic behaviour of young people.
 
21
 
 The committee proposed a system in which only
the gravest of crimes (such as murder, attempted murder and rape) would be prose-
cuted in the criminal courts, with all other crimes being dealt with by an integrated
child welfare system designed to identify the child’s needs and propose solutions.
This system would apply to children who were referred because they had committed
an offence as well as to those in need of formal care for some other reason.
Referrals to the children’s hearings system are first considered by an independent
official known as the Reporter. The Reporter determines whether there is sufficient
prima facie evidence that one of the grounds of referral is established (eg an offence
has been committed)
 
22
 
 and, if this is the case, whether compulsory measures of
supervision may be required.
 
23
 
 If so, the Reporter will refer the case to a children’s
hearing. If the ground of referral is accepted by the child and their family,
 
24
 
 the
children’s hearing will decide whether formal intervention – known as a supervision
requirement – is required to address the child’s needs.
 
25
 
The system is governed by the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. Section 16 of the
Act enshrines three overarching principles: participation, liberalism and welfarism.
 
Participation
 
A key feature of the children’s hearings system is that decisions regarding the appro-
priate response to a child’s offending are made in a non-court setting by non-judicial
personnel, following non-judicial processes. Children’s hearings are lay bodies com-
prising volunteers from the child’s community. Since the ground of referral has
already either been agreed by the child and parents or established following due
process of law in the sheriff court, hearings adopt a relatively informal, roundtable
(usually literally), dialogical process involving the lay panel members, the child, their
family and the local authority social worker. The hearing is required to give the child
the opportunity to express their views and to ‘have regard to such views’ when making
decisions.
 
26
 
 While some commentators are sceptical about the scope for authentic
participatory dialogue in such institutional contexts,
 
27
 
 studies suggest that the hearings
system is relatively successful in encouraging participation in comparison to court
 
20.
 
Kilbrandon Committee 
 
Report on Children and Young Persons, Scotland
 
 Cmnd 2306,
1964.
 
21.
 
Ibid, para 71.
 
22.
 
The grounds of referral are contained in Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 52(2).
 
23.
 
Ibid, s 56(6).
 
24.
 
If the ‘ground of referral’ is not accepted, the issue will be determined in the Sheriff
Court, with its panoply of due process protections (ibid, s 68).
 
25.
 
Ibid, s 70.
 
26.
 
Ibid, s 16(2).
 
27.
 
Eg P Squires and D Stephen 
 
Rougher Justice: Anti-Social Behaviour and Young People
 
(Devon: Willan Publishing, 2005).
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systems.
 
28
 
 The importance of these participatory values of lay involvement, commu-
nity representation and dialogical process is underlined by research which suggests
that in criminal (and, by extension, juvenile) justice 
 
how
 
 and by 
 
whom
 
 decisions are
made is as (if not even more) important to determining outcomes than 
 
what
 
 is actually
decided.
 
29
 
Liberalism
 
The children’s hearings system is itself a child of the 1960s, a time at which the so-
called labelling school of thought was forcefully advancing the view that criminal (or
juvenile) justice interventions often do not reduce offending but rather backfire and
make matters worse,
 
30
 
 and so measures which risked unnecessarily stigmatising
young people should be avoided lest they exacerbate the behaviour they were intended
to address.
 
31
 
 Consistent with this perspective, the Scottish hearings system, almost
since its inception, has been instilled with a liberal dimension which is sometimes
overlooked by critics focusing on the authoritarian potential of the hearings’ pater-
nalistic welfarism.
 
32
 
 First and foremost, the system aims to address problems (includ-
ing offending) through negotiation and the seeking of consensus. This approach is
enshrined in the overarching ‘no non-beneficial’ order, or minimum intervention,
principle, which provides that a requirement or order should only be made if ‘it would
be better for the child that [it] be made than that none should be made at all’.
 
33
 
 Priority
is thus given to seeking voluntary means by which troubled children (and their
families) might be dealt with, though it is recognised (and power is provided) that
compulsory measures may ultimately need to be imposed. Pivotal to this compulsion
as a last resort mentality is the Reporter.
 
34
 
 The Reporter has wide discretionary powers
 
28.
 
Eg C Hallet and C Murray 
 
The Evaluation of Children’s Hearings in Scotland Vol 1
Deciding in Children’s Interests
 
 (Edinburgh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit, 1998); L
Waterhouse et al 
 
The Evaluation of Children’s Hearings in Scotland Vol 3 Children in Focus
 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2000); S Asquith 
 
Children and Justice: Decision-Making in
Children’s Hearings and Juvenile Courts
 
 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983).
 
29.
 
Eg T Tyler 
 
Why People Obey the Law
 
 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); R
Paternoster et al ‘Do fair procedures matter? The effect of procedural justice on spouse assault’
(1997) 31 Law and Society Review 163.
 
30.
 
Eg H Becker 
 
Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance
 
 (London: Macmillan, 1963);
E Lemert 
 
Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control
 
 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1967).
 
31.
 
Recent empirical evidence from the longitudinal Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions
of Crime shows that young people who were processed by the juvenile justice system were
more likely to persist in their offending than those who offended at a similar level but who
were not caught (DJ Smith 
 
Social Inclusion and Early Desistance from Crime
 
 (Edinburgh,
Centre for Law and Society, University of Edinburgh, 2006)).
 
32.
 
Eg A Morris and M McIsaac 
 
Juvenile Justice?: The Practice of Social Welfare
 
 (London:
Heinemann Educational, 1978).
 
33.
 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 16(3).
 
34.
 
The importance of the diversionary role of the Reporter is underlined by research evi-
dence which suggests that the police tend to trigger formal intervention against young people
on the basis of stereotypical class biased judgments concerning their ‘respectability’ as well
as more objective evaluations of behaviour (L McAra and S Mcvie ‘The usual suspects? Street-
life, young people and the police’ (2005) 5 Criminal Justice 5).
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to divert cases out of the system where it is determined that formal compulsory
intervention is not required, and indeed does so in a substantial proportion of offence-
based cases.
 
35
 
 The minimum intervention principle is also influential in those cases
which the Reporter refers to a children’s hearing, as in a significant proportion the
hearing will prefer voluntary measures to a supervision requirement.
 
36
 
Welfarism
 
The effect of the introduction of the children’s hearings system was more or less to
subsume juvenile criminal justice in Scotland within an integrated child care system.
The Kilbrandon Committee was of the view that ‘the legal distinction between
juvenile offenders and children in need of care or protection was – looking to the
underlying realities – very often of little practical significance’.
 
37
 
 The system thus not
only deals with children who have committed a criminal offence, but also care cases,
which in England and Wales would now be dealt with by the family proceedings court
under the auspices of the Children Act 1989. One important consequence of this
integration of the child care and juvenile justice systems is that, in theory at least,
punishment is excluded from the range of powers available to children’s hearings; in
all cases the ‘paramount consideration’ is ‘the welfare of the child throughout his
childhood’.
 
38
 
 The system thus adopts a forward-looking approach, focusing on what
needs to be done to address the underlying causes of the offending (or whatever the
ground of referral to the hearings was), rather than a backward-looking approach
which focuses on punishing the individual act. This integrated, ostensibly non-
punitive approach to juvenile justice, with its emphasis on the child’s ‘needs rather
than their deeds’,
 
39
 
 has been described as a ‘paradigm example’ of a welfare-based
system of juvenile justice.
 
40
 
35.
 
In 2005/2006 a children’s hearing was arranged to consider the imposition of compulsory
measures of supervision in respect of only 13% of children referred to the Reporter on offence
grounds. For 16% of children referred, no hearing was arranged because compulsory measures
were already in place but the other children’s cases were disposed of in some other, more
informal, way (Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration 
 
Annual Report 2005/2006
 
 (Edin-
burgh: Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration, 2006) p 33).
 
36.
 
In 2005/2006 a supervision requirement was imposed or an existing requirement reviewed
in 75% of cases referred to a hearing on offence grounds, the other cases were discharged (ibid,
p 35).
 
37.
 
Kilbrandon Committee, above n 20, para 13. Empirical research bares out the committee’s
assumptions as it has been found that the similarities in the backgrounds and circumstances
between children referred to the children’s hearings system on offence grounds and those
referred for other reasons far outweigh the differences (L Waterhouse et al, above n 28).
 
38.
 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 16(1). It should be noted that s 16(5) of the 1995 Act
provides that a hearing may make a decision which is not consistent with the welfare of the
child if it is deemed necessary to protect the public. This represents the first substantive
encroachment upon what had hitherto been the undisturbed predominance of the welfare
criterion.
 
39.
 
A Lockyer and FH Stone 
 
Juvenile Justice in Scotland: Twenty-Five Years of the Welfare
Approach
 
 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998) p 18.
40. L McAra ‘The cultural and institutional dynamics of transformation: youth justice in
Scotland, England and Wales’ (2004) 35 Cambrian Law Review 23.
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THE ASBO REGIME: FIVE AREAS OF CONCERN
The readiness to resort to ASBOs
In contrast to the minimum intervention principle which shapes the Scottish children’s
hearings system, it would seem that children in England and Wales frequently receive
ASBOs even though other less formal, more constructive forms of intervention would
have been possible. At present a two-tier system of reprimands and warnings applies
where a child commits a criminal offence in England or Wales.41 A child will generally
receive a reprimand for a first offence, with a warning being issued if the offence is
too serious for a reprimand or the child has previously received one. The warning is
designed to be a once-only penalty, with prosecution normally following for a further
offence and second warnings only being given in exceptional circumstances. An
important feature of this framework is that the issue of a warning triggers the inter-
vention of the local Youth Offending Team (YOT). The role of the YOT is to assess
the child’s needs and identify programmes which can be employed to address these
needs with the intention of preventing further offending. The framework is thus
designed to divert children from the criminal justice process. However, the ASBO is
classified as a civil order and so falls outside the system of reprimands and warnings.
Moreover, whilst there are certain statutory consultation requirements which must be
satisfied before an ASBO can be applied for,42 consultation with the local YOT is
prescribed by Home Office guidance only.43 In other words, it is possible to apply
for, and obtain, an ASBO without first consulting the local YOT. In fact, the study
which the Youth Justice Board (YJB) completed for the Home Affairs Committee
inquiry found YOTs were not consulted in almost one-third of cases.44 This led the
Home Affairs Committee to state:
‘We were concerned to learn that Youth Offending Teams are not always
consulted by those taking out an ASBO. We believe that they should be consulted
as a matter of course before an application for an ASBO is made: not as a veto,
but to ensure that sufficient thought has been given to support needs and to ensure
that other measures are also taken if appropriate.’45
The YJB’s more recent study nonetheless found that many YOTs – mainly those in
high ASBO-use areas – remain dissatisfied at their involvement in the decision-
making process. Even when they are consulted, this often comes so late in the
decision-making process that it is impossible to offer diversionary alternatives and,
in any event, their contributions are given little weight.46 Rod Morgan, then
41. CDA, ss 65–66.
42. Ibid, s 1E.
43. Home Office A Guide to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London: Home Office, 2006) p
21. See also the guidance jointly issued by the YJB, the Association of Chief Police Officers,
the Home Office and the Together campaign (Anti-social Behaviour: A Guide to the Role of
Youth Offending Teams in dealing with Anti-Social Behaviour (London: YJB, 2005) pp 23–27).
44. Memorandum submitted to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry Anti-Social Behaviour
Fifth Report of Session 2004-05, HC 80 (London: TSO, 2005) vol III, Ev 219.
45. Ibid, vol I, para 137.
46. A Solanki et al Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London: Youth Justice Board, 2006) pp
52–53. This study also found that YOTs are consulted even more infrequently prior to appli-
cations for post-conviction and interim ASBOs (pp 54–55).
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chairman of the YJB, drew two inferences from this widespread failure to consult
adequately with YOTs.47 First, the possibility of adducing hearsay evidence at appli-
cations for ASBOs, coupled with the extremely wide definition of ‘anti-social
behaviour’, may mean that the ASBO is seen by some enforcement agencies as a
way of fast-tracking problem children into custody. Secondly, that ASBOs, or the
conditions attached to them, may be being imposed when they are not the most
appropriate and constructive intervention. These inferences are supported by the
YJB’s recent study, which found that many YOT practitioners believe that ASBOs
are used ‘prematurely, and that an approach that prioritised supportive intervention
over enforcement would have a greater positive impact on the behaviour of individ-
ual young people’.48
To try and combat this common failure to consider diversionary alternatives, many
areas have developed a ‘tiered’ approach to dealing with anti-social behaviour by
children, whereby a number of informal interventions must be attempted before
thought is given to applying for an ASBO. In Bridgend, for example, the first tier is
a warning letter (3000 sent out), the second is a visit accompanied by a letter from
either the police or the YOT’s ASBO support worker (400 visits made), the third is
an Acceptable Behaviour Contract (30 agreed), and the final stage is to apply for an
ASBO (two ASBOs imposed).49 In practice, however, the YJB found that in high
ASBO-use areas tiered approaches are beset by a fundamental clash of ideologies.
While YOT practitioners see their role as being to assess and address a child’s needs
in order to prevent further offending, the main priority of enforcement agencies in
such areas is to provide relief to the community quickly and decisively. For them, a
tiered approach to tackling anti-social behaviour is too slow and too uncertain. It is
thus unsurprising that the YJB found significant differences between areas in the
number of pre-ASBO tiers and in whether all tiers should be used or individual tiers
could be bypassed.50
There is a danger that the tendency, evident in England and Wales, to resort to
ASBOs too readily could also pervade the ASBO regime in Scotland. Worryingly, the
minimum intervention principle does not apply to applications for ASBOs. The role
of the hearings system’s diverter in chief – the Reporter – is also relatively reduced.
It is the local authority or registered social landlord, not the Reporter, who determines
whether to instigate the ASBO process; in stark contrast to the hearings process, there
is no legal power for the Reporter to divert cases away from formal (ASBO) inter-
vention; and it is the Sheriff Court, not the hearings system, which has been granted
ultimate decision-making power.51 These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that
there are already signs of disquiet within Scottish New Labour, at both national and
47. R Morgan ‘Anti-social behaviour: getting to the root of the problem’ (2005) 23(1) Howard
League Magazine 13.
48. A Solanki et al, above n 46, p 130.
49. Reg Denley, Programme Manager, Youth Works Scheme, Bridgend (oral evidence to the
Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 44, vol III, Q 75). For further information on
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts, see Home Office A Guide to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders
and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (London: Home Office, 2003).
50. A Solanki et al, above n 46, chs 5, 10 and 13.
51. See further A Cleland and K Tisdall ‘The challenge of antisocial behaviour: new rela-
tionships between the state, children and parents’ (2005) 19 International Journal of Law,
Policy and the Family 395 at 405–406.
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local level, about the relatively liberal approach which has so far prevailed.52 However,
in contrast to England and Wales, where the system of reprimands and warnings is
bypassed, the Scottish Parliament has made some effort to ensure that the hearings
system is tapped into at various junctures. Statute provides that when deciding
whether to apply for an ASBO the local authority or registered social landlord must
consult with the Reporter to the children’s hearings system,53 that when deciding
whether to impose an interim ASBO the Sheriff must ‘have regard’ to any views
expressed by the Reporter to the children’s hearing,54 and that, in the process for the
imposition of a full ASBO, the Sheriff must instruct the Reporter to arrange a
children’s hearing and ‘have regard’ to its advice as to whether the imposition of an
order is necessary.55 Encouragingly, guidance produced by the Scottish Executive
adds that the children’s hearings system ‘should continue to be the primary forum for
dealing with antisocial or offending behaviour by under 16 s’, and that an ASBO
‘should only be pursued for a small number of persistently antisocial young people
for whom alternative approaches have not been effective in protecting the commu-
nity’.56 This would suggest that the ASBO should generally be considered a measure
of last resort. Indeed, whilst the guidance does also state that there ‘must be flexibility
to allow for use of an ASBO before the full range of options has been exhausted
where there is a pressing need to protect the community’,57 early research would
suggest that in most parts of the country a last resort mentality has emerged, partic-
ularly in relation to under-16 s.58 So, whilst it dilutes the principle of minimum
intervention which applies in children’s hearings, the Scottish ASBO regime does
illustrate that a greater commitment to informal, diversionary schemes could be
secured in England and Wales through integration of the ASBO with the normal youth
justice process.
The forum for ASBO applications
The non-court setting of children’s hearings is one of the central planks of the Scottish
system. This stands in stark contrast to England and Wales, where children charged
with a criminal offence appear before the youth court. The youth court, a specialised
branch of the magistrates’ court, tries and sentences young offenders aged from 10
to 17 inclusive. A specialised system of criminal courts to deal with children was first
52. Eg, there are reports that the Scottish Executive’s Justice Minister has threatened to
withhold funding from councils failing to make sufficient use of enforcement powers like the
ASBO (P Macmahon ‘Use ASBOs or no cash to fight crime, councils told’ The Scotsman 10
May 2005). The influential Labour leader of Edinburgh City Council has also said that ‘ASBOs
are supposed to be a last resort for under-16 s, but what we really want is early ASBOS because
that acts as a warning’ (I Swanson ‘Move to fast-track ASBOs for teenage yobs in the Capital’
Edinburgh Evening News 28 February 2006).
53. ASB (Scotland) Act, ss 4(11)(a) and 18.
54. Ibid, s 7(3).
55. Ibid, s 4(4).
56. Scottish Executive Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act 2004: Guidance on Antisocial
Behaviour Orders (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2004) para 16.
57. Ibid, para 54.
58. DTZ Consulting and Heriot Watt University Use of Antisocial Behaviour Orders in
Scotland: Report of the 2005/6 Survey (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2006).
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introduced by the Children Act 1908. Then named the juvenile court, its rationale
was to employ special procedures geared at meeting children’s needs. Whilst the
Criminal Justice Act 1991 changed the juvenile court’s name to the youth court, it
did not alter its underlying rationale:
‘Although the powers of the youth court will in some respects be different from
those of the juvenile court, the 1991 Act preserves the distinctive features of the
juvenile court. This is intended to ensure that young people are dealt with in a way
which has proper regard for their youthfulness.’59
Proceedings in the youth court are more informal than in the adult magistrates’ court.
Magistrates sitting in the youth court are specially trained. Clear, accessible language
should be employed and legal terminology avoided. Rooms should be appropriately
furnished, without such formal and imposing features as raised benches. And sittings
of the court are closed to the public.
In certain situations, the youth court has the discretion to transfer a child to the
adult Crown Court for trial.60 Following the European Court of Human Rights’
decision that Robert Thompson and Jon Venables’ trial for the murder of James
Bulger had breached their right to a fair trial under Art 6 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR),61 Lord
Bingham of Cornhill issued a practice direction describing how Crown Court trials
involving children should be conducted. This states:
‘The trial process should not itself expose the young defendant to avoidable
intimidation, humiliation or distress. All possible steps should be taken to assist
the young defendant to understand and participate in the proceedings. The ordinary
trial process should so far as necessary be adapted to meet those ends.’62
Some of the steps which might be taken to achieve this include allowing the child to
visit the court pre-trial outside court hours to develop familiarity with the courtroom,
ensuring that all participants in the trial are on the same or almost the same level,
allowing the child to sit with his or her family and in a place that permits easy,
informal communication with legal representatives, explaining the proceedings in
language the child can understand, employing a timetable which takes account of a
child’s inability to concentrate for long periods, not wearing robes and wigs, and
restricting public attendance at the trial. However, these steps were declared insuffi-
cient to satisfy the demands of Art 40(3) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) by the United Nations Committee on the Rights
of the Child.63 Fionda writes, ‘these measures merely dress the window of the more
significant problem . . . To effectively deny the child a child’s status and then to ask
the court to be wary of the child’s youthfulness makes little sense’.64 Fortin points
59. Home Office Criminal Justice Act 1991: Young People and the Youth Court Circular
(London: Home Office, 1992). One of the differences referred to is that the 1991 Act brought
17-year-olds within the youth court’s jurisdiction (Criminal Justice Act 1991, s 68).
60. Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, ss 90–91.
61. V & T v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 121.
62. [2000] 2 All ER 285.
63. Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland CRC/
C/15/Add 188 (Geneva: Centre for Human Rights, 2002) paras 60–62.
64. J Fionda Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime (Oxford: Hart, 2005) p 139.
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out that ‘despite the greater informality, children are still required to sit in a dock,
stared at by the jury, and cross-examined by barristers’. Highlighting the stark contrast
with the civil law’s perspective on a child’s capacity to instruct a legal adviser, she
notes that ‘all those tried by the Crown Courts are considered to be capable of
instructing their lawyers and comprehending the proceedings’.65
The tendency to treat children accused of unlawful behaviour as being fully
competent, and the concomitant failure to make adequate concessions for their youth-
fulness, has also pervaded the ASBO regime. Since ASBOs are civil orders, applica-
tions for stand-alone orders fall outside the jurisdiction of the youth court and so are
heard by the adult magistrates’ court.66 The Home Office guidance requires the
applicant authority to ‘contact the justices’ clerk in advance of the hearing to ensure
that it will be conducted in a way that is suitable for the child or young person’, but
the only modification which it stipulates in such cases is that ‘the justices constituting
the court should normally be qualified to sit in the youth court unless to do so would
result in a delayed hearing’. In fact, the guidance insists that, unlike the youth court,
the proceedings should be open to the general public with no automatic restrictions
on press access or on revealing the child’s identity.67
The failure to make adequate provision for young people is even more profound
in the Scottish ASBO regime. Whilst in England and Wales one court procedure has
replaced another (albeit specially modified) court procedure, in Scotland the decision-
making hegemony of children’s hearings has been directly challenged by the Scottish
Parliament’s choice of the Sheriff Court, sitting in its summary, civil mode, as the
forum best placed to deal with applications for ASBOs against under-16 s.68 This
retrograde step is of great significance, for it marginalises key principles associated
with the children’s hearings system, principally those of participation and welfarism.
Since the Sheriff Court is presided over by a single, senior, legally qualified and
permanently appointed judge, selecting this institution as the forum for ASBO appli-
cations greatly diminishes lay involvement and community representation. This is a
surprising development, given that in recent years a discernible policy aim of gov-
ernment both sides of the border has been to attempt to address the problem of anti-
social behaviour through the empowerment of local people in affected communities.
Anti-social behaviour policy, and the wider community safety agenda, is rooted in
the intuition that attempts to govern security will be most effective when the knowl-
edge and capacity of local people is mobilised to solve local problems.69 Participation
is undermined still further by the choice of an adversarial procedure. This is antithet-
ical to the relatively informal, round table, dialogical process associated with chil-
dren’s hearings. The child in question may possibly not even be present at the hearing
65. J Fortin Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (London: Butterworths, 2nd edn,
2003) p 565.
66. Although the youth court does hear applications for post-conviction ASBOs (as does the
Crown Court).
67. Above n 43, p 16 and ch 9.
68. ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(10). The move has attracted criticism – see Cleland and Tisdall,
above n 51.
69. L Johnston and C Shearing Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice
(London: Routledge, 2003). ‘Communities’ are, of course, not invariably benign and the state
has a crucial role in ensuring that key fundamental values such as legality, equality and equity
are maintained in the rush to empower communities (see, eg, I Loader and N Walker Civilizing
Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)).
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of the application for an interim ASBO.70 Selecting the Sheriff Court as the decision-
making forum for ASBOs also compromises the principle of welfarism. It represents
a clear symbolic statement that a child’s anti-social behaviour is not primarily a matter
for an integrated child care and juvenile justice system concerned with the child’s
needs. Beyond the symbolic, the sole criteria for the Sheriff to impose an ASBO are
that the child has acted anti-socially and that an order is necessary to protect others
from further anti-social acts. Why the child’s welfare should be the paramount
consideration when a children’s hearing determines whether to impose a potentially
highly invasive supervision requirement on a child following the commission of an
offence (including a breach of an ASBO), but that welfare should effectively be
excluded from consideration when determining whether an ASBO should be imposed,
is far from clear.
So, on both sides of the border, the choice of forum for applications for ASBOs
against young people displays a failure to make adequate concessions for their
youthfulness. To a limited extent, it would be straightforward to remedy this in
England and Wales. The ASBO could be reclassified as criminal in nature so that
applications for orders fall within the jurisdiction of the youth court. Whilst the ASBO
was purposely classified as civil in nature in order to avoid the application of certain
criminal law due process protections, principally the rule against hearsay evidence,71
since the remedy was not intended for use against children avoiding the youth court’s
jurisdiction was not part of the order’s design. But, while such a change would be
welcome, it would only go some way towards meeting the needs of children accused
of anti-social behaviour. The children’s hearings system is an example of what a
decision-making forum shaped by the values of participation and welfarism should
look like. Key to it are its location outside the normal court structure and its non-
judicial processes. Whilst the youth court is less formal than the adult magistrates’
court, it is still far removed from children’s hearings.
The terms of ASBOs
Anecdotal examples of outlandish ASBOs are becoming increasingly common – the
ASBO banning a woman who had attempted suicide on four occasions from jumping
into rivers or canals or onto railway lines, and the ASBO banning a pensioner from
feeding pigeons in his back garden being just two examples.72 Equally fantastic orders
have been imposed on children. A 13-year-old was banned from using the word
‘grass’ for 6 years, and a 15-year-old boyfriend and girlfriend were banned from
speaking to each other for 4 years.73 Proponents of the ASBO argue that examples
like these are exceptional. This may or may not be true; the burgeoning case-law on
70. ‘There is no explicit provision for any representations made by or on behalf of the
respondent before an interim ASBO is granted, although the court, using its discretion, can
consider any such representations as it sees fit’ (Scottish Executive, above n 56, para 86).
71. A Ashworth ‘Social control and “anti-social behaviour”: the subversion of human rights?’
(2004) 120 LQR 263.
72. R Savill ‘Woman banned from jumping in the river’ The Daily Telegraph 26 February
2005; ‘Bird lover gets Asbo for feeding pigeons’ The Times 31 July 2006.
73. D Aitkenhead ‘When home’s a prison’ The Guardian Weekend 24 July 2004; J Freer and
R Preece ‘Sweethearts banned from seeing each other’ Plymouth Evening Herald 3 February
2005.
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the topic certainly suggests that there is a prevalence of poorly drafted ASBOs.74 But
concerns about the prohibitions imposed by ASBOs extend beyond these sorts of
anecdotal and isolated examples.75 These concerns relate, first, to so-called preventive
prohibitions and, secondly, to the negative nature of the prohibitions which ASBOs
impose.
In England and Wales, Home Office guidance insists that the formulation of
prohibitions must be given careful thought.76 However, the YJB’s study of ASBOs
imposed on children between January 2004 and January 2005 found that often the
prohibitions imposed are not targeted or realistic, but formulaic.77 The study
expressed particular concern about ASBOs which impose geographical exclusions
or prohibitions on associating with particular people. This concern was given added
weight by the study’s finding that each type of prohibition features in roughly half
of all ASBOs.78 Indeed, they are expressly encouraged by the Home Office guid-
ance,79 and have also been endorsed by the Court of Appeal. In R v Boness Hooper
LJ explained: ‘The aim of an ASBO is to prevent anti-social behaviour. To prevent
it the police or other authorities need to be able to take action before the anti-social
behaviour it is designed to prevent takes place’.80 So, if a group of young people
assemble on a housing estate to race motor bikes, the ASBO should not merely
prohibit them from racing motor bikes. It should also prohibit them from being in
each other’s company on the estate. This would allow the authorities to intervene
as soon as they begin to assemble, and so not have to wait for them to begin
racing.
Preventive prohibitions, which include curfews as well as geographical exclusions
and bans on associating with particular people, are difficult to square with the insti-
tutional values – particularly the principle of welfarism – which are central to the
children’s hearings system. They may nonetheless be imposed on both sides of the
border, because, just as in England and Wales, the Scottish legislation states that an
ASBO is not limited to preventing repetition of the anti-social behaviour – the order
may impose any prohibitions deemed necessary for the purpose of protecting others
from further anti-social behaviour by the person subject to the order.81 The statutory
74. Amongst the prohibitions which the appeal courts have held to be invalid are: ‘In any
public place, wearing, or having with you anything which covers, or could be used to cover,
the face or part of the face. This will include hooded clothing, balaclavas, masks or anything
else which could be used to hide identity, except that a motorcycle helmet may be worn only
when lawfully riding a motorcycle’ (R v Boness [2005] EWCA Crim 2395, [2006] 1 Cr App
R (S) 120); ‘Not to be a passenger in or on any vehicle, whilst any other persons is [sic]
committing a criminal offence in England or Wales’ (W v Acton Youth Court [2005] EWHC
954 (Admin), (2006) 170 JP 31); and ‘Not to be in possession of any bladed article’ (R v
Starling [2005] EWCA Crim 2277). Some general guidance on drafting the terms of ASBOs
is set out in the judgment of Hooper LJ in R v Boness, and in chapter 7 of the Home Office
guidance (above n 43).
75. See also S Macdonald ‘ASBO prohibitions and young people – Hills v Chief Constable
of Essex Police’ (2007) 19 CFLQ (forthcoming).
76. Above n 43, p 29.
77. Solanki et al, above n 46, p 141.
78. Ibid, p 75.
79. Above n 43, ch 7.
80. Above n 74, para [36].
81. ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(6); CDA, s 1(6).
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requirement to give paramount consideration to the child’s welfare, which shapes
decision making in a welfarist direction in the children’s hearings system, does not
apply. This focus on public protection provides fertile ground for the kind of preven-
tive prohibitions which have been actively encouraged in England and Wales.82
One consequence of this focus on public protection at the expense of the principle
of welfare is that preventive prohibitions may prove counter-productive. Sometimes
this counter-productivity is obvious. For example, an 18-year-old in Manchester was
given an ASBO which prohibited him from congregating with three or more other
youths. He was subsequently arrested when he entered a successful local youth club
with a good reputation on the grounds that there were more than three youths in the
premises, even though the session scheduled for that evening was how to deal with
anti-social behaviour.83 But they can also be counter-productive in a more general
manner. Access to public space and spending time with friends is of great importance
to young people.84 Emphasising this, the YJB study states that preventive prohibitions
reduce the likelihood of cooperation and compliance. The majority of breach cases
centre on failure to comply with these types of prohibitions. A more targeted
approach, with more sparing use of preventive prohibitions, would help reduce the
incidence of breach of ASBOs.85
Preventive prohibitions may also breach children’s rights under Arts 8, 10 and 11
of the ECHR. Whilst the infringement of these rights may have the legitimate aim(s)
of preventing crime and disorder and/or protecting the rights and freedoms of others,
it is arguable that they are disproportionate. Although the Strasbourg Court has not
explicitly recognised the ‘least restrictive means’ test as an aspect of proportionality,
it ‘has often in practice decided the question of proportionality by asking whether a
particular measure could be achieved by a less restrictive means’.86 Yet preventive
prohibitions not only ban repetition of the anti-social behaviour (the motor bike
racing), they also ban conduct which is necessarily prior to it (assembling on the
housing estate). To the extent that such orders extend beyond prohibiting a child’s
anti-social behaviour, it is arguable that they violate the ECHR.
82. It should be noted that, since a children’s hearing can make a decision which is not
consistent with the welfare of the child if it is necessary to protect the public from serious harm
(above n 38), an ASBO could conceivably be imposed through an application of this exception
to the general rule that the child’s welfare is paramount.
83. National Association of Probation Officers ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders – analysis of
the first six years’ Memorandum submitted to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n
44, vol III, Ev 185. In a similar vein, ASBOs have been imposed which include a curfew that
stopped a young person from getting employment opportunities because he could not get to
work early enough, and which prohibited a young person from entering any motor vehicle,
thereby preventing him from accepting lifts from staff of the local Youth Offending Team to
Positive Activities schemes and from getting on a probation minibus to take him to do his
community service (Memorandum submitted by the YJB to the Home Affairs Committee
inquiry, ibid, vol II, Ev 143). Fully involving the local YOT in the process of applying for an
ASBO would help prevent counter-productive prohibitions of the sort described.
84. See H Matthews, M Limb and M Taylor ‘The “street as thirdspace” ’ and T Skelton
‘Nothing to do, nowhere to go?’ in S Holloway and G Valentine (eds) Children’s Geographies:
Playing, Living, Learning (London: Routledge, 2000).
85. Above n 46, pp 142 and 148.
86. R Clayton and H Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000) para 6.47. For examples, see Campbell v United Kingdom (1992) 15 EHRR 137 para
48 and Ahmed v United Kingdom [1999] IRLR 188 para 63.
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In England and Wales, there is a further reason for believing that ASBOs which
impose preventive prohibitions on children (and also ASBOs which only contain non-
preventive prohibitions) may be held to be disproportionate. Unlike Scotland, where
there is no statutory minimum duration for an ASBO,87 in England and Wales all
ASBOs must last for at least 2 years88 – which is a long time in the life of an adolescent.
The Home Affairs Committee opined that this minimum duration is ‘inappropriate’
in the case of children, and that magistrates should be given greater discretion to set
the duration of an order.89 Maurice Kay LJ’s acceptance that ‘Just because the ASBO
must run for a minimum of two years it does not follow that each and every prohibition
within a particular order must endure for the life of the order’90 has mitigated the
rigidity of the 2-year minimum duration to some extent. The Home Office guidance
also states that ASBOs against children should be reviewed annually by the bodies
that applied for the order in the first place. If these bodies decide that any of the
prohibitions are no longer necessary, they should apply to vary or discharge the order.91
However, the YJB study not only found that a significant number of children are being
served with ASBOs well in excess of 2 years, but also that, in practice, there is no
evidence that orders are proactively reassessed once they have been made.92
The second set of concerns regarding the terms of ASBOs relates to the fact that
they must be negative in nature – an ASBO cannot place positive requirements on an
individual. An order will thus do little to address the underlying causes of the
behaviour. This is especially significant given that the Home Affairs Committee found
that young perpetrators of anti-social behaviour often suffer from serious disadvan-
tages and social exclusion and have significant support needs.93 The committee con-
cluded that the ‘most important’ reason why almost half of all ASBOs are breached
is the ‘insufficient support given to perpetrators who may have problems of addiction
or of mental health or may be living in chaotic families’.94
Burney has observed that a purely negative measure like the ASBO would be
‘unthinkable’ in the welfarist Swedish system.95 Seeking to adapt the order for the
similarly welfarist Scottish system, the Scottish Parliament and Executive have
attempted some integration with the hearings system. So, for example, the Sheriff
must obtain the advice of the Reporter when determining whether to impose an
interim ASBO, and the advice of a children’s hearing when determining whether to
impose a full ASBO.96 And if an ASBO or interim ASBO is imposed, the Sheriff is
granted the discretionary power to order that a children’s hearing be arranged to
determine the nature and extent of any compulsory measures of supervision that may
be necessary to run alongside the ASBO.97 In a similar vein, the Criminal Justice Act
87. ASB (Scotland) Act, s 4(5).
88. CDA, s 1(7).
89. Above n 44, vol I, para 222.
90. R (Lonergan) v Lewes Crown Court [2005] EWHC 457 (Admin), [2005] 2 All ER 362
at [13].
91. Above n 43, p 45.
92. Above n 46, pp 73 and 141.
93. Above n 44, vol I, para 87. The findings of the YJB were similar (above n 46, ch 4).
94. Ibid, vol I, para 224.
95. E Burney Making People Behave: Anti-Social Behaviour, Politics and Policy
(Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2005) p 157.
96. ASB (Scotland) Act, ss 7(3) and 4(4) respectively.
97. Ibid, s 12.
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2003 introduced the Individual Support Order (ISO) in England and Wales.98 An ISO
– designed to ‘address the underlying causes of the behaviour that led to the ASBO
being made’99 – imposes positive requirements on an individual, such as meeting with
a specified person or participating in specified activities (like counselling for sub-
stance misuse or an anger management programme). If the arrangements for imple-
menting ISOs are available in the area in which the child resides, a magistrates’ court
making an ASBO must either issue an ISO or explain its reasons for not doing so.100
An ISO can require an individual to attend sessions for up to 2 days per week, for a
period of up to 6 months. Breach of an ISO without reasonable excuse is a criminal
offence, punishable (in the case of those aged 14 and over) by a fine of up to £1000.101
The creation of the ISO represents a welcome concession that the imposition of
negative prohibitions cannot, in itself, tackle the underlying causes of an individual’s
anti-social behaviour. However, while in Scotland any supervision requirement is
imposed by a children’s hearing shaped by the values of participation and welfarism,
an ISO is imposed by a court. Moreover, for ISOs to have a chance of working
effectively requires that sufficient resources are made available and that these
resources are targeted properly.102 The YJB found that over one-third of sentencers
were unaware of the ISO or their power to impose it. Moreover, the children that
ASBOs are sought against had often had previous contact with the local YOT, which
led a majority of sentencers to opine that the ISO will only prove to be a useful
measure in a small proportion of cases. Some also added that ISOs are ‘too little too
late’, and are no substitute for a lack of earlier support to families.103 And there is a
further difficulty. In R (McCann and Others) v Crown Court at Manchester104 the
House of Lords applied the three criteria set out by the European Court of Human
Rights for determining whether applications for ASBOs are civil or criminal proceed-
ings.105 One of the reasons the Lords gave for their conclusion that proceedings for
the imposition of an ASBO are civil in nature was that ASBOs only impose negative
prohibitions, and so are intended to be preventative, not punitive. Lord Hope of
Craighead stated:
98. In addition to the ISO provisions, CDA, ss 8–9, provide that any court imposing an ASBO
on a child aged under 16 must also issue a Parenting Order or explain why a Parenting Order
would not be desirable in the interests of preventing repetition of the anti-social behaviour. For
16- and 17-year-olds the court may make a Parenting Order if it considers that an order would
help prevent repetition of the behaviour. On the subject of Parenting Orders, see L Koffman
‘The use of anti-social behaviour orders: an empirical study of a new deal for communities
area’ [2006] Crim LR 593 and J Lyon, C Dennison and A Wilson ‘Tell them so they Listen’:
Messages from Young People in Custody Home Office Research Study 201 (London: Home
Office, 2000).
99. Anti-social Behaviour: A Guide to the Role of Youth Offending Teams in dealing with
Anti-Social Behaviour, above n 43, p 27.
100. Note that a court making a post-conviction ASBO cannot issue an ISO, the rationale being
that the sentence imposed for the criminal offence should tackle the underlying causes of the
anti-social behaviour.
101. The statutory framework governing ISOs is found in CDA, ss 1AA and 1AB.
102. See the report of the Home Affairs Committee, above n 44.
103. Above n 46, pp 70 and 143.
104. [2002] UKHL 39, [2003] 1 AC 787.
105. The three criteria are the classification in domestic law; the nature of the offence; and
the nature and degree of severity of the penalty (Engel v The Netherlands (No 1) (1979–80) 1
EHRR 647).
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‘The essential characteristics of an anti-social behaviour order are that the
defendant is prohibited from doing something . . . An anti-social behaviour order
may well restrict the freedom of the defendant to do what he wants and to go
where he pleases. But these restrictions are imposed for preventive reasons, not as
punishment.’106
The Home Office has recognised that, since attaching an ISO to an ASBO increases
the burden on the individual, it makes it more difficult to regard the combination of
orders as being purely preventive.107 The creation of the ISO post-McCann thus raises
the question whether, in relation to children,108 the civil classification of ASBOs is
still appropriate.109
Publicising the details of ASBOs
In criminal proceedings in the youth court in England and Wales, there is a presump-
tion that a child’s personal details should not be divulged.110 This protection of a
child’s anonymity accords with a child’s rights under the UNCRC and Beijing
Rules.111 But since the ASBO is classified as a civil order, the presumption in favour
of anonymity is reversed, so that there is instead a presumption in favour of disclo-
sure.112 The argument that there should be a presumption in favour of anonymity at
applications for ASBOs, even though the proceedings are civil ones, was rejected by
the High Court in R (T) v St Albans Crown Court.113 Far from reinforcing the child’s
106. At paras [75]–[76].
107. The Home Office gave this as a reason for rejecting arguments that it should be possible
to impose an ISO for a longer period than 6 months (Supplementary memorandum submitted
by the Home Office to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 44, vol III, Ev 171).
108. Following the creation of the Intervention Order (CDA, ss 1G–1H), similar logic could
also now apply to ASBOs against adults.
109. For an argument that the hybrid nature of the ASBO means that the Lords in McCann
should have classified it as criminal in nature, see S Macdonald ‘The nature of the Anti-Social
Behaviour Order – R (McCann & Others) v Crown Court at Manchester’ (2003) 66 MLR 630.
110. Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 49. This presumption is reversed where a child
is tried in the Crown Court (R v Central Criminal Court, ex p W [2001] 1 Cr App R 2).
111. UNCRC, Art 40(2)(b)(vii); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Adminis-
tration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules), r 8.
112. Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 39. Where a child is convicted of a criminal
offence in the youth court and a post-conviction ASBO is imposed, the presumption of
anonymity is reversed in those parts of the proceedings concerned with the making of the order
(CDA, s 1C(9C)). The presumption in favour of anonymity is also reversed where a child is
prosecuted for breach of an ASBO (CDA, s 1(10D)), the rationale being to ‘allow local
communities to be involved in the justice system by ensuring that breaches of antisocial
behaviour orders can be publicised, so that people can see who is doing what and where it is
being done’ (David Blunkett Hansard HC Deb, vol 428, col 1059, 7 December 2004).
113. [2002] EWHC 1129 (Admin). In a similar vein, the High Court in R (K) v Knowsley
Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] EWHC 1933 (Admin), [2005] HLR 3 rejected the
argument that there should be a presumption in favour of anonymity at proceedings for the
imposition of an interim ASBO. Harrison J explained ‘that the interim nature of the proceed-
ings, which do not involve any findings on the allegations, is a very important consideration
to put into the balance so that it can be balanced against the undoubtedly important
consideration . . . relating to publicity assisting in the effectiveness of enforcing the interim
order’ (at para [44]).
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interest in anonymity, Elias J explained that ‘where an anti-social behaviour order has
been imposed, that is a factor which reinforces, and in some cases may strongly
reinforce, the general public interest in the public disclosure of court proceedings’.114
Home Office guidance reiterates this, stating that a court must have a ‘good reason’
to prevent identification of the young person and that ‘Age alone is insufficient to
justify reporting restrictions being imposed’.115
Whether a similar approach will prevail in Scotland is uncertain. There is a strict
ban in the children’s hearings system on any publicity which may identify a child
subject to the hearings process.116 Public identification would not only be antithetical
to the system’s liberal-welfare values, but would also jeopardise the perceived legit-
imacy of consensual decisions regarding the child’s future conduct reached in accor-
dance with participatory values. Moreover, s 44(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act
1995 – which prohibits the publication of information intended to, or likely to,
identify a child or the child’s school/address in any case about which the Principal
Reporter has received information – will apply to all applications for ASBOs because,
as noted above, the Principal Reporter will receive information about each and every
ASBO case concerning a child under the age of 16 at various stages of both the interim
and full ASBO process. The effect of the section, breach of which is a criminal
offence, is thus to create a strong presumption against publicity. And although the
Sheriff retains a power to allow publication ‘in the interests of justice’,117 deciding
whether to exercise this discretion constitutes the determination of a matter with
respect to a child and so the Act’s overarching requirement to regard the welfare of
the child as paramount applies.118 Since it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in
which publicity could be consistent with the paramountcy principle, publicity should
only be permitted in the rare situation where the Act permits the principle to be
disregarded – where it is necessary to protect the public from ‘serious harm’.119 This
is very unlikely to be the case where a child has committed minor criminal or non-
criminal anti-social behaviour.
‘Naming and shaming’ strategies nonetheless have political appeal. The Scottish
Executive’s First Minister, Jack McConnell, returned from a fact-finding trip to
England’s ‘ASBO capital’, Manchester, apparently impressed by the Council’s uncom-
promising approach, including ‘name and shame’ tactics. It has also been reported
that a policy of ‘naming and shaming’ of under-16 s could be included in Labour’s
manifesto for the forthcoming elections to the Scottish Parliament.120 Plus, in spite
of the provisions of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 outlined above, guidance
published by the Scottish Executive states that since the ASBO is ‘a public court
document . . . the fact that it has been made and its terms and duration are in no way
confidential’.121 The guidance goes on to say that it is for the Sheriff imposing the
order to determine whether publicity should be permitted, taking into account the
need to justify the interference with the individual’s rights under Art 8(1) of the ECHR.
114. Ibid, at para [22].
115. Working Together – Guidance on Publicising Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (London:
Home Office, 2005) p 4.
116. Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 44(1).
117. Ibid, s 44(5).
118. Ibid, s 16(1).
119. Ibid, s 16(5).
120. B Ferguson ‘We’ll shame young thugs’ Edinburgh Evening News 17 January 2006.
121. Above n 56, para 120.
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The guidance describes the individual’s age as merely an ‘important factor’ to consider
when balancing the rights of the individual with the public interest. So publicity
campaigns similar to those in England and Wales may yet also be mounted in Scotland.
The Home Office guidance issued in England and Wales gives five reasons for its
insistence that ‘publicity should be expected in most cases’.122 Of these five, three –
public reassurance about safety, public confidence in local services and deterring
other perpetrators – could equally be used to justify divulging the personal details of
children charged with a criminal offence; yet in criminal proceedings a presumption
of anonymity applies. This raises the question whether the other two reasons –
enabling local people to police the order and (therefore) deterring the child from
breaching the order – are in themselves sufficient to justify reversing the presumption
into one in favour of disclosure.
Whether it is necessary to disclose a child’s personal details to enable victims of
the anti-social behaviour to police an ASBO is doubtful – victims will often know,
or at least be able to recognise, the child in question. But it is not just victims who
are expected to police the order. The whole community, victims and non-victims, are
expected to play their part, a stark example of a ‘responsibilization strategy’.123
Orchestrating publicity campaigns to disseminate the information non-victims need
to police an ASBO risks fostering anger and resentment in the local community. Such
an approach, which encourages a lynch-mob mentality and exacerbates social exclu-
sion, resonates with Rutherford’s description of the ‘eliminative ideal’.124 The naming
process does nothing constructive to aid a child’s reintegration into the community.
It is disintegrative.125 Unsurprisingly, the YJB found widespread concern amongst
professionals about publicising the details of children with ASBOs, and that, in some
cases, public identification acted as a badge of honour and created a sense of satis-
faction about causing trouble.126 Publicly naming children, who are engaged in a
process of self-development and so are susceptible to stigmatisation, ignores the
lessons of the labelling theorists of the 1960s.
But, even if one were to accept that, notwithstanding the concerns just outlined,
the benefit of enabling the local community to police ASBOs outweighs a child’s
interest in anonymity, a further concern remains – the nature of the rhetoric that tends
to accompany such publicity. Demonising headlines like ‘Ban on Devil Kid, 10’, ‘The
Imps of Satan’, ‘Reclaim our Streets: Yob War’ and ‘Hellraiser cannot use front door’
are all too familiar.127 In R (Stanley) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,128 the three
teenage claimants sought a declaration that material carrying their photographs,
names, ages and the details of the ASBOs issued against them breached their Art 8
ECHR right to respect for their private and family life. The material included state-
ments on the council’s website describing the gang members as ‘thugs’ and as ‘bully
122. Above n 115, p 2.
123. D Garland ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contem-
porary Society’ (1996) 36 Brit J Criminol 445.
124. A Rutherford ‘Criminal Justice and the Eliminative Ideal’ (1997) 31 Social Policy and
Administration 116.
125. J Braithwaite Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
126. Above n 46, ch 9.
127. The Sun 22 April 2004, Daily Mail 4 May 2004, Daily Mirror 31 August 2004 &
Liverpool Daily Post 20 January 2005 respectively.
128. [2004] EWHC 2229 (Admin), [2005] HLR 8.
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boys’ who engaged in ‘animalistic behaviour’ and a leaflet which included a state-
ment, under the heading ‘Lets (sic) Complete the Job’, that the gang members could
be imprisoned if caught breaching their ASBOs. Rejecting the claimant’s argument
that their Art 8 rights had been violated, the High Court held that the language used
in the publicity was not disproportionate. Kennedy LJ stated: ‘The language used in
some of the publicity was colourful, but having regard to the known facts already in
the public arena it was entirely appropriate, and the colour was needed in order to
attract the attention of the readership’.129
Condoning the use of colourful language extends beyond permitting dissemination
to the local community of the information they need to police an order. Colourful
language is likely to be emotive, sensationalist and stigmatising. As argued above, it
is likely to hamper a child’s development, heighten social exclusion and harbour
resentment in the local community. Resorting to such rhetoric in order to stir local
people into policing ASBOs should not be an acceptable tactic.
Custodial net-widening
In England and Wales persistent offenders aged 15–17 and persistent, dangerous
offenders aged 12–14 who breach an ASBO may receive a custodial sentence – the
maximum being a Detention and Training Order of up to 24 months’ duration.130 In
Scotland, by contrast, the Scottish Parliament has expressly provided that custodial
sentences cannot be imposed on under-16 s who breach an ASBO.131 The significance
of this is more symbolic than practical; as per the vast majority of criminal cases in
Scotland, breaches of ASBOs involving under-16 s will almost invariably be dealt
with by the children’s hearings system rather than prosecuted by the Procurator Fiscal
in the criminal courts.
Between 1992 and 1997 the number of 10–17-year-olds sentenced to custody in
England and Wales rose by about 40%. After levelling off, the number then fell by
17% between the first quarter of 2001 and the third quarter of 2003.132 This was
welcomed by Rod Morgan, who stated that, whilst there is no alternative to keeping
some young offenders in custody, ‘the number of these young offenders is consider-
ably smaller than the present custodial population’.133 A few months later, at the start
of 2005, Morgan wrote:
‘In early 2004, following a 15 month trend of reducing numbers, the Youth
Justice Board witnessed an alarming surge in the number of juveniles in custody:
a 10% increase, compared with the usual seasonal rise of around 5%. Given the
backdrop of falling crime, the question was: Why? Suspicions arose as to whether
the increasing popularity of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) . . . might
partly be responsible.’134
129. Ibid, at [40].
130. Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 100. For all other under-18 s breach
is punishable with a community penalty. Note also that a conditional discharge is not an
available disposition for breach of an ASBO (CDA, s 1(11)).
131. ASB (Scotland) Act, s 10, amending the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
132. Audit Commission Youth Justice 2004: A Review of the Reformed Youth Justice System
(London: TSO, 2004) p 35.
133. YJB Annual Review 2003/04 – Building in Confidence (London: YJB, 2004) p 4.
134. Above n 47.
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These suspicions were understandable. The Home Office have insisted that the courts
should not ‘treat the breach of an order as just another minor offence’.135 And the
courts have held that, where an act constitutes a stand-alone criminal offence as well
as breach of an ASBO, the sentence which may be imposed for the ASBO breach is
neither calculated with reference to the sentence that would normally be imposed for
the stand-alone offence nor limited by the stand-alone offence’s maximum sen-
tence.136 Moreover, there was anecdotal evidence which suggested that the ASBO was
causing an increase in the number of children in custody.137 The YJB accordingly
carried out a study to examine the profile of those children entering custody as a result
of breaching an ASBO.138 It found that 95% of the children in the study were already
known to the local YOT, that the average number of previous offences committed by
those children for whom previous offence history was available was 42, and that the
children had been subject to various interventions prior to a custodial sentence.
Morgan thus concluded that the ASBO did not appear to be drawing into custody
children who, prior to the introduction of the order, would not have ended up there.139
Nonetheless, given the readiness to resort to the ASBO in England and Wales, it
remains possible that the ASBO could widen the custodial net for young people. The
lack of integration with the normal juvenile justice process means that the ASBO
regime south of border contains few safeguards against net-widening. This stands in
contrast to Scotland. Whilst the children’s hearings system, as an integrated child
welfare system, is ostensibly non-punitive, highly interventionist measures are pos-
sible. The supervision requirements which may be imposed can include a requirement
to be looked after for a time in local authority accommodation, and – in some
circumstances – placing the child in secure accommodation (thus depriving them of
their liberty)140 or imposing a movement restriction condition involving electronic
tagging.141 But in Scotland there are a number of ‘protective shields’142 which provide
a bulwark against escalatory tendencies. First and foremost, by rooting the breach
135. Above n 43, p 48. Earlier versions of the guidance contained similar statements. Signif-
icantly, the Youth Court Bench Book (London: Judicial Studies Board, 2006) states that ‘Breach
of an order is a serious criminal offence and should be tackled quickly and effectively’, and
then qualifies this: ‘It is not always necessary to impose a custodial sentence for breach of an
ASBO, especially where the original behaviour for which the ASBO may have been imposed
was not sufficiently serious to carry a custodial sentence’ (p 1-52; emphasis added).
136. R v H, Stevens & Lovegrove [2006] EWCA Crim 255, [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 453. For
discussion of this aspect of the ASBO, see S Macdonald ‘The principle of composite sentenc-
ing: its centrality to, and implications for, the ASBO’ [2006] Crim LR 791.
137. See T Donovan ‘Antisocial orders come under fire’ Young People Now 28 April 2004 and
the memorandum submitted by the YJB to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 44,
vol II, Ev 143.
138. The findings are contained in the supplementary memorandum submitted to the Home
Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 44, vol III, Ev 217. The YJB warned that the sample size
for the study was relatively small and that the study had methodological limitations. Its more
recent study stated that it was impossible to ascertain, from the available data, ‘whether the
ASBO, and any subsequent breaches, exacerbated the risk of custody over and above what
would have been expected from further offending in any event’ (above n 46, pp 113–114).
139. Oral evidence to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry, above n 44, vol III, Q 450.
140. Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 70.
141. ASB (Scotland) Act, s 135, amending Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 70.
142. A Rutherford ‘Youth justice and social inclusion’ (2002) 2 Youth Justice 100.
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process firmly in the mainstream children’s hearings system rather than the criminal
justice system, the institutional values of participation, liberalism and welfarism
should help prevent any significant increase in the use of secure accommodation.143
The role of the overarching minimum intervention and welfare principles in s 16 of
the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and their application by Reporters and children’s
hearing panellists against the background of an increasingly punitive political and
media climate will be crucial in this regard. Secondly, there is the practical reality
that the number of places in secure accommodation in Scotland is, at present, rela-
tively small (fewer than 100), and although there are moves to increase slightly the
capacity of this secure estate, the restricted numbers prevents the children’s hearings
system and local authority social work chiefs from resorting to incapacitation as a
convenient strategy for dealing with troublesome youth.
CONCLUSION
Over the past century, youth justice policy in England and Wales has fluctuated
between broadly punitive and welfarist approaches.144 There have also often been
bifurcations of policy, with a punitive approach being adopted for some, normally
serious or persistent, young offenders, and a welfarist approach prevailing for others
who are perceived as merely a nuisance.145 Since the murder of James Bulger, political
and public attitudes towards young offenders have hardened, and a punitive approach
has dominated.146
At the heart of the punitive approach is a conception of young offenders as ‘devils’.
Fionda explains:
‘The youth justice process increasingly denies young offenders their childhood,
since as devils, they are assigned adult-like attributes of evil and the competence
of free will . . . If the devilish nature of offending young people can be banished
– by coercion if necessary – then the assumption is that they can reclaim their
“childhood” and rejoin the “angels”.’147
The ASBO is a prime example of this perspective. Although it was designed solely
for use against adults, the government has encouraged its use against young people.
143. A children’s hearing can only authorise the placing of a child in secure accommodation
if either the child, having previously absconded, is likely to abscond unless kept in secure
accommodation and if he absconds, it is likely that his physical, mental or moral welfare will
be at risk; or the child is likely to injure him or herself or some other person unless kept in
such accommodation (Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 70). Moreover, the s 16 ‘minimum
intervention’ and ‘welfare’ principles are applicable to secure accommodation decisions.
144. See, eg, A Rutherford Growing out of Crime: The New Era (Winchester: Waterside, 1992).
Note that there are emerging signs of divergent approaches to childrens’ rights in England and
Wales – see J Williams ‘Incorporating children’s rights: the divergence in law and policy’
(2007) 27 LS 261.
145. See, eg, AE Bottoms, K Haines and D O’Mahony ‘Youth justice in England and Wales’
in J Mehlbye and L Walgrave (eds) Confronting Youth in Europe (Copenhagen: AKF, 1998).
146. J Fionda ‘Youth and justice’ in J Fionda (ed) Legal Concepts of Childhood (Oxford: Hart,
2001).
147. Fionda, above n 64, p 6.
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The ASBO regime in England and Wales thus has little regard for the youthfulness
of children who engage in perceivedly anti-social behaviour,148 and attaches little
weight to the principles of participation, liberalism and welfarism.
Empirical evidence illustrates the importance of the principle of welfarism. A
simplistic ‘devils’ and ‘angels’ dichotomy is impossible to sustain. Offenders and
victims are very often the same people, with offending predicting victimisation and
vice versa.149 Children who offend could just as easily have come to official attention
as children in need of care and protection.150 A non-bifurcated, welfare-based
approach, which focuses in a child-centred, holistic, positive and inclusionary way
on addressing the child’s various troubles, is most appropriate. In spite of this, the
statutory criteria for the imposition of an ASBO on a young person do not include
his/her welfare. Home Office guidance states:
‘There should be no confusion as to the purpose of the order, which is to protect
the community. Where the case concerns a child, the welfare of the child is, of
course, to be considered, and indeed the making of the order should contribute to
this by setting standards of expected behaviour. But the welfare of the child is not
the principal purpose of the order hearing.’151
This failure to recognise the importance of the principle of welfarism is further
illustrated by the frequent imposition of preventive prohibitions, by the 2-year mini-
mum duration of an ASBO, and by the promotion of publicity campaigns which
commonly employ ‘colourful’ language. Arguments that measures like these are
needed to control crime rates are rebutted by victimisation data from Scotland, which
suggests that it is possible to have less crime without a punitive juvenile justice
system,152 and from a comparative study of different systems in two cities (one in
Germany, the other in the USA) showing that a highly punitive interventionist crim-
inal justice system does no better at deterring juvenile crime than a relatively lenient
approach.153
Empirical evidence also underlines the importance of the principle of liberalism.
Self-report studies suggest that offending and anti-social behaviour is so prevalent in
the teenage years that it can be viewed as a relatively normal feature of adolescence,154
and that all but a small minority will be ‘adolescent limited offenders’155 and will
‘grow out of’ crime and anti-social behaviour.156 The ASBO nonetheless sits abreast
148. For discussion of the so-called youth problem, and the factors which have contributed to
its emergence, see Burney, above n 95, pp 64–76.
149. DJ Smith The Links Between Victimization and Offending (Edinburgh: Centre for Law
and Society, University of Edinburgh, 2004).
150. See, eg, Waterhouse et al, above n 28.
151. Above n 43, p 33.
152. DJ Smith ‘Less Crime Without More Punishment’ (1993) 3 Edinburgh Law Review 294.
153. D Huizinga et al The Effect of Juvenile Justice System Processing on Subsequent Delin-
quent and Criminal Behaviour: A Cross National Study (Washington: National Institute of
Justice, 2003).
154. See, eg, D Wilson, A Sharp and D Patterson Young People and Crime: Findings from the
2005 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (London: Home Office, 2006).
155. T Moffitt ‘ “Life course-persistent” and “adolescence-limited” antisocial behaviour: a
developmental taxonomy’, (1993) 100 Psychological Review 674.
156. Rutherford, above n 144.
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of the diversionary scheme of reprimands and warnings, allowing YOTs to be mar-
ginalised and the order to be resorted to too readily. This is especially dangerous
given the potential for formal intervention to backfire and increase rather than reduce
the risk of recidivism. The ASBO closely fits Sherman’s description of the conditions
which are likely to cultivate proud and shameless defiance, resulting in a net increase
in the prevalence, incidence or seriousness of the behaviour a measure was intended
to address.157
The disregard for participatory values is evidenced by the fact that applications
for ASBOs are heard in the adult magistrates’ court, with little being done to help
young people understand or participate in the proceedings. This is especially unfor-
tunate given that New Labour recognised the importance of these values by adopting
the Youth Offender Panel (YOP) system for first-time offenders pleading guilty in the
youth court.158 It could even be argued that YOPs subscribe more fully to participatory
values than the children’s hearings system because they can include the victim(s) of
the offending as well as community representatives.159
Assuming that the ASBO will continue to form part of the government’s campaign
against anti-social behaviour, we believe that greater weight could be given to the
principles of participation, liberalism and welfarism by making three fundamental
changes to the ASBO regime in England and Wales insofar as it applies to young
people. First, the order should be reclassified as criminal in nature.160 Indeed, the
creation of the ISO may dictate this. Secondly, a new independent specialised agency
analogous to the Reporter should be established to oversee the prosecutorial functions
in relation to youthful criminal anti-social behaviour. Thirdly, orders should only be
imposed by special ‘youth panels’, the composition of which would resemble existing
157. The four conditions identified by Sherman are: (1) the sanction is unfair – a young person
subject to an ASBO may regard it as either substantively unfair (eg the terms seem to him to
be overly restrictive) or procedurally unfair (eg not able to participate in or understand the
proceedings); (2) the individual is poorly bonded to or alienated from the sanctioning agent or
the community the agent represents (often the effect of an ASBO is to exacerbate social
exclusion); (3) the individual defines the sanction as stigmatising and rejecting a person, not
a lawbreaking act (ASBOs are often accompanied by publicity campaigns); and (4) the indi-
vidual denies or refuses to acknowledge the stigmatising shame that has been imposed (evi-
dence that some young people regard ASBOs as a badge of honour). See further L Sherman
‘Defiance, deterrence and irrelevance: a theory of the criminal sanction’ (1993) 30 Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency 445.
158. The government has recently shown interest in injecting participatory values into the
ASBO process in England and Wales by giving ‘communities’, in the form of Tennant Man-
agement Organisations, the power to apply for ASBOs (draft SI The Local Authorities (Con-
tracting Out of Anti-Social Behaviour Order Functions) (England) Order 2007 (London:
HMSO, 2007)). The significance of YOPs is that they show how participation can be harnessed
in a more inclusionary manner.
159. The evaluation of the YOPs found that as regards opportunities to participate, understand-
ing of the process and perceived fairness of the proceedings, young people and their families
rated the YOP process highly in comparison to their experience of the Youth Court (T Newburn
et al The Introduction of Referral Orders into the Youth Justice System: Final Report Home
Office Research Study 242 (London: Home Office, 2002)).
160. For the argument that ASBOs should be classified as criminal in nature regardless of
whether they are imposed on adults or children, see Macdonald, above nn 109 and 136.
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institutional architecture in the form of YOPs,161 though our proposed panels would
be primarily welfarist rather than restorative in nature.162
If ASBOs were classified as criminal in nature, the scheme of reprimands and
warnings would apply, and so a young person would only be eligible for an ASBO
if he or she had previously received a warning. If a young person who has received
a warning is charged with committing a criminal act of anti-social behaviour, his or
her case would be referred to the new prosecutorial official who would be granted a
wide discretion to determine whether formal measures might be required. The prin-
ciples of minimum intervention and welfare would apply to decision making. If it
was determined that formal measures might be necessary the child would be referred
to a youth panel if he or she either admits guilt or (if guilt is denied) if the youth
court finds liability established.163 Commission of the crime would thus act as a
ground of referral, as in the children’s hearings system.164 In accordance with partic-
ipatory values, the youth panel would adopt an informal, dialogical process, aiming
to reach consensus. As in the existing YOP system, victims would continue to be
invited to attend. A range of measures, including those which may currently be
included in an ISO, would be available. The panel’s paramount consideration would
be the young person’s welfare. Whilst imposition of an ASBO would be available,
the principle of minimum intervention would apply and so an order would not
normally be imposed. If an ASBO was imposed – either through mutual agreement
or because the young person is deemed to pose a serious risk – the welfare principle
would also apply to the terms of the order, which would militate against the use of
preventive prohibitions. The ASBO’s criminal classification, coupled with the princi-
ple of welfarism, would dictate a strong presumption in favour of anonymity. In the
event that an ASBO is imposed and subsequently breached, the prosecutorial official
would determine whether a custodial sanction might be necessary and, if so, refer the
case for prosecution in the youth court where Detention and Training Orders would
remain an available sanction.165 However, the principles of minimum intervention and
161. A YOP is composed of one member of the local youth offending team and two lay
community representatives.
162. While recognising the value of restorative principles (particularly their participatory
quality), the prioritisation of welfarism (and liberalism) in our scheme serves to address a well-
made criticism of the new youth justice arrangements in England and Wales (including the
YOPs), that young people in trouble are viewed as offenders first and children second (see, eg,
B Goldson ‘Children in need or young offenders? Hardening ideology, organisational change
and new challenges for social work with children in trouble’ (2000) 5 Child and Family Social
Work 255).
163. This would differ from the existing arrangements for YOPs, whereby a child is only
referred to a YOP if he pleads guilty. It is arguable that this restriction infringes the presumption
of innocence. For a critical analysis of the YOP process see C Ball ‘The Youth Justice and
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 Part I: a significant move towards restorative justice, or a recipe
for unintended consequences’ [2000] Crim LR 211.
164. As Cleland and Tisdall point out, making commission of acts of anti-social behaviour a
new ground of referral to the children’s hearings system could have avoided many of the
difficulties that may now face the Scottish system following the extension of the ASBO to
under-16 s (above n 51).
165. The youth court could be granted discretionary power to revert the case to the youth panel
for (non-custodial) disposal in appropriate cases. The power to refer a case to a children’s
hearing for disposal is often used by the courts in Scotland in the small number of under-16 s
cases that are prosecuted rather than referred to the children’s hearings.
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welfarism would apply which would mean that custody should only be resorted to if
truly necessary.
In spite of the introduction of the ASBO against 12–15-year-olds in Scotland, the
primary forum for dealing with young offenders remains the children’s hearings
system. This system regards young offenders as simply one subgroup of the broader
category of children in need, and so adopts an approach based on the principles of
participation, liberalism and welfarism. South of the border, the ASBO has quickly
become one of the most popular measures in the campaign to tackle anti-social
behaviour by young people, notwithstanding the fact that the remedy was designed
for use solely against adults and that a large number of the children who receive
orders suffer from serious disadvantages and social exclusion and have significant
support needs. This paper has shown how, by reclassifying the ASBO and introducing
new youth panels, greater weight could be given to the values at the heart of children’s
hearings. This would encourage a more effective response to the needs of young
people who behave anti-socially.
